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Queers and Muslims: The Dutch Case
Gert Hekma
I. Introduction
For about a decade, antagonisms have been mounting between Muslim and gay men. In
particular, when El Moumni spoke out against homosexuality in 2001, many politicians
and gays reacted angrily. White Dutch got the feeling that Muslims did not respect or
accept gays, lesbians, and women in general because of their supposedly homophobic and
sexist views.1 That a disproportional part of the anti-gay violence can be attributed to
male Moroccan youngsters has become another ground upon which to attack Muslims.
Pim Fortuyn, the right- wing leader who was murdered in 2002, exploited the antihomosexuality stance of a large portion of the Muslim religious leaders and the queer
bashing attributed to ethnic minority youth, using it as a stick to beat the Muslims for
their backwardness. They should not be able to sufficiently integrate in a Dutch society
that is defined, in the eyes of the right wing, by its longstanding support for the
emancipation of women, gays, and lesbians. Although the issue of gay-Muslim relations
is continuously discussed in Dutch society and politics, the political answers have been
unconvincing up until now. Rhetoric has been more important than doing something. In
this article, I will first discuss the early history of the gay-Muslim debate, then the
subsequent rise of antagonism since the interventions by El Moumni and Fortuyn, and
finally the contemporary social and political answers on the issue.
The focus regarding Muslims will be on Moroccans. Although the number of people of
Turkish descent is higher than that of Moroccan descent (380,000 versus 340,000) and
there are substantial numbers of Muslims of other ethnicities (a third of the 340,000
Surinamese, for example),2 male youth of Moroccan origin are most often seen as the
troublemakers. Of course, not all Moroccans or Turks are Muslim, and there also are
differences in religious beliefs between and inside ethnicities. The Turkish Alevites, for
example, have less strict views on gender and sexual relations than other groups that
sometimes reject them for their religious liberalism. Most of the Moroccans came from
the northern Rif area and are Berbers, not urban Arabs. Likewise, most Turks arrived
from conservative Anatolia, not from modern cities. Notwithstanding their traditional
background, the first generation of immigrants was rather lax in its practice of religion. It
was the second generation that could be said to be more modern, for example, because of
higher levels of education, but they also became more strict and orthodox in terms of
religion. As elsewhere, the number of women wearing scarves has grown significantly
since the early 1990s.
II. Background
For a long time, Morocco was mainly known by gay men as an exciting tourist
destination. In particular, Tangier, when it was an international enclave (1923–1956),
attracted many homosexual tourists, such as Paul and Jane Bowles, Tennessee Williams,
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William Burroughs, Joe Orton, Jean Genet, Juan Goytisolo, and many others less well
known.3 The sexual outcasts from the West found exile in this border city of the Orient.
What had been Capri and Taormina in Italy, the French Riviera, or Tunisia and Algeria
before the Second World War, became Morocco in the 1950s and 1960s. Single men who
visited the main tourist attractions were accosted by young men, who not only sold goods
but also their bodies. What has become known as sex tourism was part and parcel of
Morocco’s attractions for many gay men. Nowadays, Marrakech and to a lesser degree
Tangier, Agadir, and Essaouira continue this gay tradition. The Dutch poet and writer Jan
Hanlo (1912–1969) left a moving tribute of his visit to Marrakech in which he described
his tumultuous relationship with an 11-year-old black boy, Mohamed, in Go to the Mosk,
a Dutch novel with an English title, published in 1971. As a Catholic, he did not want to
have the sex that Mohamed and his friends eagerly offered, but one time he could not
resist.
Moroccans came to the Netherlands halfway through the 1960s as “guest workers.”
They were mostly single men, often coming from France and Belgium where they had
worked. Seduced by the better pay and work conditions, they continued north. Other men
were directly recruited from Morocco by Dutch companies.4 There is little known about
how these single men organized their sexual lives, but they certainly had white
girlfriends, went to prostitutes, and also had gay sex, both among themselves and with the
locals. It remains unclear how actively they participated in male sex work as compared
with their compatriots back home. Their rather free social and erotic life ended in the late
1970s, when the guest workers brought their recently founded families or their new
brides over to the Netherlands.
A second generation of Dutch Moroccans made its appearance in urban life, the result
of fertile families that had arrived since the late 1970s. In the 1980s, a new situation
developed, with a growing Moroccan population that started to transform churches and
old industrial buildings into mosques or to build new ones. The demographic and urban
landscape changed. The single men had become family fathers. Instead of living a male
homo-social life in hostels, they now created hetero-social nuclear families and started to
pay attention to religion. Most of them began to look more like their fathers in Morocco
than their Dutch colleagues or neighbors.
III. 2001
It took some time before the new situation received critical attention in the political arena
and media. The ideal of a multicultural society where many different ethnicities
peacefully lived together faltered. Neighbors complained about the loud noises and
strange smells the new immigrants produced. Dutch women who dressed sexily were
sometimes insulted as being whores. In criminal statistics and the media, Surinamese
were replaced by Turks and even more by Moroccans as being the most prone to commit
crimes. While the white population of poor urban areas began to complain about their
new neighbors, politicians showed concern but no alarm as most of them continued to
believe in multicultural ideals.
Slowly, the white Dutch got “realistic,” meaning that they abandoned the ideals of a
multicultural society and became convinced that the new immigrants caused many
problems that had not existed before on this scale. The extreme Right had always said so,
28

but they had been politically marginalized. The first respectable politician who voiced
this idea in the 1990s was Frits Bolkestein, leader of the conservative-liberal party
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, or
VVD). This party represents the capitalist entrepreneurs who brought the guest workers
to Holland out of economic interests, but did not take responsibility for the cultural
consequences once the guests became locals. The most vocal opponent of immigration
was openly gay Pim Fortuyn, whose spectacular rise to celebrity status in 2001 changed
the Dutch political landscape radically. His party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), received a
sixth of the votes in the national elections of May 2002. It put an end to eight years of
“purple” government (i.e., non-Christian, with a liberal approach). This cabinet had
opened up marriage for same-sex couples and legalized prostitution. It consisted of
conservative and progressive liberals (VVD and D66) and the Labour Party (PvdA).
Some days before the elections of 2002, Fortuyn was murdered by an animal rights
activist who opposed his support for the meat and fur industry, rather than his critique of
Muslims. Fortuyn had begun as a Marxist professor in the social sciences in Groningen
during the 1970s, and had become a typical right-wing politician by the end of the
century. He was a populist and against bureaucracy and a strong state. In favor of more
police and tougher sentences for criminals, he also wanted to stop immigration. He was
popular among many Dutch who praised him because “he dared to say the truth” that
other politicians were apparently hiding. One of the “truths” they liked was his critique of
multicultural society. His followers did not always like homosexuals, but they admired
Fortuyn (like they do the gay comedians on television of which Holland has its share:
André van Duin, Paul de Leeuw, Paul Haenen, Jos Brink). In other words, homosexuals
are nice at a distance rather than close-by. Fortuyn may have been a faithful Catholic, but
he loved dark rooms for sex better than churches for praying, as he told an Orthodox
Protestant journalist some days before his murder. He knew very well, he said, that
Moroccan culture was backward because he had slept with Moroccan youngsters. In the
media, he was typically presented as a gay dandy with expensive suits and cars, and a
grand house full of male nude art. He was the complete opposite of the poor young
ruffians with whom he had sex.5 After Fortuyn was murdered, his party had no gay
political agenda and no gay politicians any longer. The next governments were led by
Christian-Democrat Jan Peter Balkenende (2002–2010). The first of these was with
Fortuyn’s party, LPF, which was unsuccessful because of internal fighting among the
inexperienced ministers of the LPF. Balkenende’s cabinets (the next ones were with
VVD, D66, and PvdA) gradually became stricter on immigration and integration of nonWestern persons. It also promoted conservative sexual policies with a focus on traditional
values and the nuclear family. Gays and lesbians became an exception to the conservative
rule.
Most straight and gay Dutch believed that homosexual emancipation had been
accomplished by 2001. With nearly all gay rights being enshrined in the law, without any
discriminatory regulations left over, and with the opening of marriage to same-sex
couples, they believed the struggle for equal rights had ended and the gay and lesbian
movement could close its doors. Legal rights did not mean social equality, however.
Fortuyn was one of the first to denounce the new situation in which queers were bashed,
school teachers did not dare any longer to be “out” in front of their classes, and gays and
lesbians were chased out of their homes by young neighborhood hoodlums. The media
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typically described such incidents as being perpetrated by young Muslim men who did
not like queers. This group may have been overrepresented in these cases, but there were
many white males involved. Gay and lesbian social emancipation had not been
accomplished, although the white majority liked to portray itself as liberal and
progressive; it was innocent of such assaults, projecting them onto ethnic minority and, in
particular, Muslim male youth. The Dutch, who had only recently started to tolerate gays
and lesbians, now created a distinction between a nation that prided itself on having
always been tolerant of religious diversity and women’s emancipation—now adding
support for homosexual emancipation—and Muslims that did not. The latter were
accused of regarding their own religion as the one and only true faith, looking down on
non-Muslims. They were also thought to have no respect for women and homosexuals or
their legal and social rights. After 2001, the dichotomy between a gay-tolerant Holland
and Muslims who were intolerant to the level of violence escalated with the affair of
Khalil El Moumni.
IV. El Moumni6
On March 7, 2001, the daily newspaper De Volkskrant reported on anti-homosexual
violence in Rotterdam, the city of the national Gay Pride celebration to be held in June of
the same year. Under the ominous heading “No Gay Man Dares to Go Out to Party in
Rotterdam in Latex,” it reported that especially ethnic minorities would be prone to queer
bashing. A gay man told the reporter that he had been chased out of his apartment by
Turkish neighbors, who had not only threatened him, but had actually beaten him up.
They objected to his walking naked in his ground-floor apartment and to his
homosexuality. The police had recommended that he move to another part of town.
Professor of Sociology Han Entzinger, specialist on ethnic minorities and advisor to the
government, suggested in the same article that gay men should restrain themselves and
make their sexuality not too public, thus adding white straight norms to the topic of
Muslim anti-gay violence.7
After this article was published, editors of the daily television program “Behind the
News” on Nova picked up the issue. They aired the program on the third of May, the day
before the national commemoration of those who died in the Second World War, which
is a very symbolic moment for the older generation. The opening featured gay men
telling about being harassed by Moroccan youngsters. Members of a group of Moroccans
then expressed their abhorrence of homosexuality. Interviews with gay Muslims were cut
out of the program. The central story was about imam El Moumni, who made statements
against homosexuality. He said that it was forbidden in Islam and that Dutch society
would disappear if it allowed the disease of homosexuality to spread. Later, it would
become known that he had also opposed queer bashing, but again, that part was left out
by the editors of the program. This editing policy made the statements of the imam more
explosive as it gave the impression that he inspired the violence against gay men.8 On the
other hand, the imam had at greater length deplored homosexuality and stated in a book
that Europeans were less than dogs or pigs because these animals at least do not know
same-sex marriages.9
The television show caused a storm in Holland. The day after it aired, the gay
movement reacted with indignation and a gay member of parliament suggested investing
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more in citizenship lessons for imams. Two others suggested extraditing El Moumni to
his home country. His position was, however, supported by imams of various mosques.
Panels on homosexuality and Islam were organized while journalists, scholars, gays, and
straights voiced their opinion. Several gay men filed a complaint against the imam, but
the case proved unsuccessful and he was acquitted on appeal.10 Various Christian leaders
had been acquitted in the past after voicing similar anti-gay ideas because of the freedom
of religious expression. Islam and Christianity were not that far apart in their ideas on
homosexuality, which derive from similar sources, with liwat (the sin of the people of
Lot) being similar to sodomy (the sin of the inhabitants of Sodom where Lot lived). While
the main Dutch Protestant churches had changed their interpretation of this story from a
condemnation of homosexuality to one of not respecting the laws of hospitality, most
Muslims (and orthodox and evangelical Christians) had kept to the traditional view.
The Minister of Urban Affairs rejected the intolerance of the imam, and wanted to talk
to El Moumni and his colleagues.11 This meeting with some hastily assembled Muslim
leaders was disappointing. El Moumni regretted his remarks, according to the minister,
but immediately after the encounter, the imam repeated (in front of the cameras) his
beliefs about homosexuality once more.12 The stern speech of the Minister of Urban
Affairs in support of tolerance and the acceptance of homosexuality was repeated by the
Prime Minister, who used the full ten minutes of his weekly interview warning the
Muslims to respect Dutch tolerance of homosexuality.13 It was one of the very few times
he spoke in public about homosexuality during his eight years in office. Some ethnic
minority members denounced the unbalanced reaction of the Dutch political
establishment to the remarks of the imam. The Prime Minister never spoke out against
the anti-gay ideas of Christians and the Minister of Urban Affairs never invited the
Catholic clergy to discuss the concepts of liberal tolerance and gay emancipation.14
Although the topic was high on the political agenda, no politician came up with concrete
proposals to improve the situation (for example, policies ensuring the safety of gays and
lesbians or for an enhanced public visibility of homosexuality). It merely boiled down to
the sermons of imams against the pontifications of politicians.
Gay and Muslim organizations, including the Islam and Citizenship Foundation and
Yoesuf, the organization focusing on homosexuality, met and issued a declaration. They
regretted the remarks of El Moumni and spoke out in favor of continued discussion
among all concerned groups, in the best Dutch tradition. This was later done in Dialoog
meetings. They also urged politicians and police to combat violence and discrimination
whether it regarded Muslims or gays, and demanded more attention to sexual diversity in
schools and social work.15 Shortly after the scandal, Omar Nahas of Yoesuf published
Islam en Homoseksualiteit, which offers a more liberal Islamic view. According to his
interpretation, it is sexual abuse rather than homosexuality that is forbidden.
V. Gay Ethnic Minority Visibility16
On several occasions the scandal exploded again. Half a year later, a Surinamese imam
declared that, according to the Qur’an, public homosexuality deserved the death
penalty.17 In an Amsterdam mosque, a religious tract was found that stated that men
guilty of homosexuality should be thrown from the highest building. Every time, the
media reacted loudly and politicians announced measures, but nothing happened except
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that most Dutch by now believed that in Islam homosexuality is generally seen as a sin
that should be punished with the death penalty.
Another result was a greater visibility of Arab and Muslim homosexuality. Newspapers
published long articles on the abundant closeted homosexual life in Muslim countries.18
Several authors referred to the rich tradition of gay poetry in Arabic.19 The Foundation
Yoesuf was often asked for comments and made clear that Muslim and gay are not
mutually exclusive, but may be combined in persons and groups. The day after the imam
spoke out against homosexuality, the first gay Arab bar in Amsterdam, Habibi Ana (My
Beloved), was opened. After some hesitation, Habibi Ana took part in the annual Gay
Canal Parade with an Arabian “1001 Nights” boat that was a big hit in the media.20 The
bar’s owner is a Dutch-Egyptian Coptic Christian. Very few of the gay ethnic
spokespersons were, or are, second-generation Turks or Moroccans. The leaders of
Yoesuf were exiles from Syria and Sudan, while Cem Ariklar of the International
Platform of Turkish Homosexuals (IPOTH, 1995–2000) was Christian. The gay Arab
spokespersons of Secret Garden (since 1995) and the Foundation Habibi Ana (since
2001) are, respectively, an Algerian and a Palestinian exile. After 2001, the only secondgeneration Moroccan in this group, Chafik Gadir, started the foundation Nafar for NorthAfrican men with homosexual feelings. Hakan Kuyucu, who came to Holland for his
studies, founded the Turkish Harem Events, organized parties and participated in panels.
Most gay ethnic organizations are male initiatives, and often rely on the one person
who founded it. Consequently, IPOTH, Yoesuf, and Harem Events collapsed after their
initiators left. Yoesuf became the multicultural Malaica in 2009, and Pink Istanbul took
the place of Harem Events in 2007. These organizations are mainly for Arabs, Muslims,
and Turks. The last Surinamese organizations, SuHo (Surinamese Homosexuals) and
Sister Outsider, stopped around 1986. There has never been a specifically Moroccan
foundation. The one mixed ethnic organization, Strange Fruit, was active in the 1990s
and dissolved just before 2001. Most gay ethnic initiatives were concentrated in
Amsterdam, but SuHo had a strong base in The Hague, and other cities saw some minor
activities. In the Bijlmer (Amsterdam South-East), a gay and lesbian black Surinamese
underground world of parties and support networks was only known to the initiated. The
Arab gay parties of Secret Garden and Habibi Ana are also highly successful, but under
the condition that the visitors may stay anonymous.
The ethnic gay movements had complicated relations with the main white LGBT
organization, Center for Culture and Recreation (COC). Originating in 1946, this name
dates from 1948. The COC did not handle cooperation with the other groups very well
due to cultural misunderstandings. It was also too preoccupied with itself and lobbying
local and national governments, while paying less attention to the desires and demands of
its members, white or black. On the other hand, the ethnic gay organizations never
became very professional. They faced problems with the technicalities of planning and
grant demands. Their main problem was ambivalence towards homosexuality. They
resisted identity and confrontational politics, regarded gay white men as preoccupied with
sex and homosexuality, circumvented explicit language, and were not too eager to
criticize ethnic cultures that relied strongly on families and religions that were not very
open to (sometimes even strongly opposed to) homosexuality. This ambivalence between
their “own” ethnic and gay community, between family and individual, and between
speaking and silencing (with the closet ajar), made them quite invisible. Sometimes they
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denied their identity because in their cultures, sexual identities would not exist. They
moved back and forth between romantic ideas of gay freedoms and painful memories of
denial or rejection of homosexuality in their cultures of origin. The queer ethnic identities
that indeed exist often belong to the most abject: the man who has lost his honor and
masculinity because he likes to be penetrated, the zemel of Moroccans, the ibne of Turks,
the boeler of Surinamese. For gay-identified ethnic minority men and women, there is in
general no way back to their culture of origin. They do not feel at home in white gay
culture, and a third way is not being developed. Many of them get stuck in a dead-end
alley. The desire of authorities to render them visible and produce gay ethnic role models
made politicians invest subsidies in movements that have difficulties in playing the
political game of identity, community, visibility, and the clear language of sexual
citizenship. One should not, however, exaggerate the level of visibility and strong speech
of white gays and lesbians. Certainly in “tolerant” Netherlands, they have become
complacent and enjoy the limited freedoms of the gay-friendly enclaves to which they
have moved.
VI. Right, Left, and the Gay Cause
In the years following the El Moumni affair and the Fortuyn murder, the Netherlands saw
a major new novelty. The extreme Right had nearly always been opposed to
homosexuals, gay rights, and queer visibility, but nonetheless homosexuals often had
leading positions in right- wing parties and groups, the most well-known case being Ernst
Röhm, comrade in arms of Hitler and leader of the SA, or, much less known, in the 1970s
in Holland, Henri Brookman and Alfred Vierling. With Fortuyn, it embraced for the first
time a gay leader and gay rights (or some people would rather say tolerance of gays and
lesbians). Soon Fortuyn would find followers like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Rita Verdonk, and
Geert Wilders, who all belonged to the VVD, but Verdonk and Wilders later created their
own parties, Trots op Nederland (Proud of the Netherlands) and the Partij van de Vrijheid
(Party of Freedom). Like Fortuyn’s successor in Rotterdam, Marco Pastors, they all
spoke out forcefully in favor of homosexual rights and often at the same time against the
Muslims that endangered Dutch gender and sexual freedoms because of their sexist and
homophobic ideology. Their outspoken perspective created a dichotomy of the
“progressive” Dutch and the “backward” Muslims who had no respect for Dutch
tolerance and should be taught what Western morality meant. Multicultural society had
been a mistake of the “Left church,” which developed a very negative meaning and many
journalists and intellectuals who had been leftist turned to the right. They contended that
the Dutch should become proud of their nation and history again. This has led to various
initiatives going from more citizenship lessons or classes about Dutch history to the
initiative for a national museum dedicated to stricter immigration laws.
The support of the right-wing leaders was very different in quality. Fortuyn himself was
an openly gay man but his party had no homosexual agenda. Verdonk, Minister of
Immigration and Integration for the VVD (2003–2007), was a real “fag hag”: she loved
gay men and was surrounded by a gay clique. When she started her own party, Proud of
Netherlands, in 2007, her main advisor and supporter was Ed Sinke, a gay man who had
been chairperson of the Amsterdam VVD. The COC leader, Frank van Dalen, belonged
to this group, and he invited Verdonk to be on the jury of the annual Gay Parade in 2007.
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Her party lost its one seat in the parliamentary elections of 2010, but still had a boat in
the annual Amsterdam Gay Canal Parade that year. In her youth, she had been leftist and
a member of the pacifist-socialist party, forerunner of the Green Left (GL). As VVD
Minister, she obliged new immigrants to the Netherlands from the Global South to pass
an examination at the Dutch Embassy in their home country. They must be able to speak
some Dutch and know about Dutch culture. The 2005 documentary “Naar Nederland”
(Coming to the Netherlands) was part of the teaching material. It showed images of
women with nude breasts on a beach, half-naked people at a pop festival, a lesbian and a
gay marriage, and two men kissing in a landscape.21 Because in Muslim countries this
imagery was deemed obscene, an abridged version was produced without this material.
Some queer theorists have denounced this documentary as Islamophobic because of the
gay material used to frighten Muslims,22 but at the same time it fulfills the demands of
the LGBT movement to include gay and lesbian material in public representations of the
Netherlands, from history books and museums to tourist information. The critique of the
movie by queer theorists backfires because no gay or lesbian visibility will ever be
possible as long as it offends orthodox (and other) people who dislike or reject
homosexuality.
Many Dutch also would rather not see kissing gay men representing their country. In
fact, some 42 percent of the population rejects two men kissing in public, as was shown
in the documentary. A tension apparently exists between Verdonk’s liberal image and the
lack of tolerance that nearly half of the Dutch voice. Liberal and secular attitudes toward
sexual imagery frighten many people, but this should be no reason to halt the struggle for
sexual citizenship rights. Sexuality is not solely a private affair without public
consequences, as many Dutch people would rather like to see it.
Hirsi Ali had worked for the Labor Party but walked over to the VVD and became one
of its Members of Parliament. She was very concerned with the plight of Muslim women,
but found little support in the concerned group because she was considered to be too
harsh on Islam, for example accusing the Prophet of child abuse because he had sexual
relations with his wife Aisha when she was nine years old. Her documentary,
“Submission” (2004), showed a woman whose naked body was totally veiled but still
visible. Verses of the Qur’an that expressed the secondary role of women in Islam were
written on her body while female voices told stories of abuse and violence by Muslim
men. The movie created a worldwide scandal.23 She and the producer, Theo van Gogh,
received death threats and the same year, Van Gogh was murdered by an orthodox
Muslim who left a letter stuck with a knife on his dead body addressed to Hirsi Ali (who
was probably too well protected to be the murderer’s target). Hirsi Ali had wanted to
make a movie about the persecution of gays by Muslims as a sequel to “Submission,” that
showed gay men rather than women as victims of Islam. That documentary was never
made.
In 2006, Hirsi Ali gave a speech at the opening of the first Dutch exposition on the
persecution of homosexuals in Nazi times. Her presence was already controversial
beforehand because some gay and lesbian intellectuals protested against her appropriation
of the gay issue, but they found little support. Their tactics were not very convincing, as
they downplayed the discrimination against gay men and lesbians, both in Holland and in
Turkey, suggesting that Hirsi Ali exaggerated the problematization of the gay issue.24 In
her speech, Hirsi Ali stressed how important the topic in fact was, and also how much she
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learned in this regard from her first teacher of Dutch, a gay man. This is a recurrent
theme in the integration story of leaders with Muslim backgrounds: Mohammed Sini,
Haci Karacaer and Rotterdam’s mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb told similar stories. Sini even
translated the love letters of his gay teacher to a Moroccan lover. This speech was the
final public performance of Hirsi Ali as Dutch MP, because her Dutch identity was
questioned some weeks later by then Minister Verdonk (both women being of the same
party) as she had not given her real name when she sought asylum in Holland. In the end,
Hirsi Ali was allowed to keep her Dutch passport but sought refuge in the United States
where she now works for the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research (which would never allow her to make a gay “Submission”).
Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) are nowadays the main voice of the right
wing. The party has grown from nine (2006) to 24 (2010), out of 150 seats in parliament,
and is now a candidate for government participation. They use the question of gay rights
as a way to denounce Muslims because of their homophobia. Any occasion of queer
bashing is being used by his party against Muslims, notwithstanding the many young
white men who also commit this kind of violence. According to the former responsible
minister, Ronald Plasterk, without referring to any data, half of the youngsters involved
in anti-gay violence belongs to an ethnic minority. The PVV, however, is convinced it
must be 80 percent.25 The party also complains that the minister is too soft on this issue,
and has suggested that he replace his approach with the punishment that the perpetrators
should clean the dark sex rooms of gay bars.26
In 2008, Wilders followed in Hirsi Ali’s steps by making an anti-Muslim film, “Fitna.”
It denounced both the oppression of women and gay men in Islam, and included footage
of the execution of two gay youth in Iran.27 The Dutch feared the reactions of Muslims
and Muslim countries, but the film did not create the national and international
commotion that “Submission” produced, probably because of its amateur quality in terms
of production and acumen.
Most of the right-wing support has remained rhetoric. At the same time, the Left and
liberal parties, who have supported gay rights for a longer time (although often halfheartedly), became more wary of continuing to do so. They were afraid they could lose
their important constituency of ethnic minority voters, who have no strong inclination to
discuss homosexuality, let alone engage with gay rights issues (most clearly the case with
the PvdA). In 2004, leftist ideals of multiculturalism were once more shattered with the
murder of Theo van Gogh. At that time, Amsterdam’s mayor, Job Cohen (PvdA), started
an intensive program of urban solidarity, We Amsterdammers, which was intended to
combat the antagonisms that also appeared to be part and parcel of ethnic diversity. In the
past, the Left had always underlined the positive sides of multiculturalism. Cohen has
often been accused of “drinking tea” with the different groups, and although he himself
claimed its utter necessity, his right-wing opponents would see it as façade politics. After
several incidents of anti-gay violence, the city also included gays and lesbians more
actively in their strategies for urban cohesion. Apart from antagonisms regarding
ethnicity and religion, homosexuality and sexual morality became regarded as issues of
controversy between tolerant old Amsterdammers and intolerant Moroccans (and other
ethnic minorities) that divided society. Although the city stepped up its subsidies for
LGBT emancipation, especially for ethnic gay organizations, very little was structural. It
was based on short-term repression, like security cameras in gay areas, rather than on
35

long-term prevention. What the queer movement always regarded as essential—more
investments in sexual and gender diversity education—was never realized, although some
of the LGBT projects were intended for schools.
The year 2009 witnessed the rise to national prominence of Ahmed Marcouch, mayor
of the Amsterdam borough of Slotervaart, because of his pro-homosexual policies. This
former police officer and Labor party man of Moroccan descent had already become
known because he did not defend youngsters of his own ethnicity, but said without
qualms that they were real nuisances for everybody. In 2009, he published a report in
which he stated certain aims for his neighborhood. First, he wanted a gay/Muslim bar (all
Amsterdam gay bars are in the center city) and suggested the annual Gay Parade should
start in his district. The first topic is still pending, but the second happened. In 2009, the
city’s own boat, with Marcouch and Amsterdam mayor Job Cohen, took off from Nieuwe
Meer (New Lake), which is also the location of Amsterdam’s largest public cruising area.
Marcouch, moreover, suggested two more long-term aims: sexual citizenship education
that definitively would include LGBT topics for the schools in his vicinity and looking
behind the front doors of homes, meaning that he intended to control parental education
in terms of the treatment of girls and LGBT children. In a country where the nuclear
family has a “holy” status, this was radical. It also was too drastic for his own party,
which became very divided. Many accused him of moving forward too quickly or of
being overly engaged in gay emancipation.
By breaking through Labor’s hesitating attitudes, Marcouch showed how ambivalent
his party remains on gay issues. He also attacked both Christian parties that were in the
government with Labor, the Christian Democrats (CDA, then Holland’s largest party)
and the Christian Union (CU, a small orthodox Protestant party). According to him, the
leaders of both parties, Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Vice Prime Minister
André Rouvoet, should come forward in support of LGBT emancipation, not only for the
country but also because the topic remains difficult for their own voters and inside their
own parties. A black evangelical female member proposed, for example, to exclude open
gays and lesbians from official posts in the CU. When Balkenende was questioned by
Muslim students in Indonesia about Dutch gay marriage, the first thing he remarked was
that he himself had voted against it, thus showing his homophobia while being in
function.28 In January 2010, Marcouch lost the election for the social-democrat leadership
in his district by a narrow margin to an unknown Moroccan opponent. The strong support
of local and national leaders of his party had not helped him, showing how controversial
his pro-gay policies were in his own ethnically diverse district. Because of his popularity
among the party’s leaders for being one of the very few charming and convincing Labor
politicians, his career did not end there, and he became MP for Labour in the 2010
elections.
The attitudes of Left and Right show how confused the situation in Holland is. All
secular parties support gay rights and in orthodox Protestant circles they discuss the issue
with vehemence while the CDA remains silent but tolerates in its own ranks married gays
and lesbians. The CDA had in the former cabinets an openly lesbian minister of
agriculture and an openly gay minister of economy, both married to a same-sex partner.
Notwithstanding this “openness,” homosexuality is still regarded with ambivalent
feelings. Although same-sex marriages have been legal since 2001, under the present
government, civil servants are allowed not to register such weddings if they have moral
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objections. This would never be allowed with Jewish, Muslim, or mixed marriages to
which civil servants might object. All parties hesitate to fully embrace LGBT
emancipation, and often only pay lip service to it. As previously noted, the political
support is more project-based than structural management, more rhetoric than investment.
It is often very normative because of the condition that queers must behave in a “normal”
way.
VII. The Situation of Gays and Lesbians
In 2006, a government commissioned report on the acceptance of gays and lesbians, to
which I contributed, was published.29 In general, up to 95 percent of the Dutch population
is said to have no objections to homosexuality. This is the highest score of being gay
friendly worldwide. Yet when more specific questions are asked, and homosexuality gets
“closer,” the percentages drop quickly. As mentioned, 42 percent of the Dutch do not
want to see two men kissing in the streets, 31 percent object to two women doing the
same, while only eight percent states so about a mixed couple. In different fields
(adoption, gay and lesbian neighbors, best friends, private physician, teacher) and with
various groups, numbers of homo-negativity remain high. Additionally, one wonders
about the “politically correct” nature of these answers. The government also wanted to
know about levels of discrimination. The report concluded that intolerance, including
insults and violence against gays and lesbians and non-acceptance in schools, in families
and workplaces still continued at levels that were difficult to assess because of dark
numbers. Two-thirds of Dutch gays and lesbians report negative experiences related to
their sexual orientation despite the assumption that they will not experience these because
they often behave in “normal” ways and many will do so out of self-protection. Many
gays and lesbians, and also authorities, continue to accept discrimination as being routine
and often do not record the relevant cases. A usual reaction of teachers, school directors,
and parents to a youngster being insulted is not to protect them but to say it does not
mean anything.
What was most remarkable from the interviews done with gays and lesbians on
experiences in the workplace was the heteronormativity. The gay men in particular
strongly desired to be seen as normal in terms of gender. Coming out was not really an
issue any longer, because if they did not come out themselves, their colleagues would out
them. Being out was a positive thing, however much struggle it might have cost. People
who were suspected of being gay or lesbian and who were not out were not highly
regarded. But being out for gay men meant that they should not behave in “unmasculine”
or overly sexual ways. The terms of communication were set by straight people who
could say that gay men should not be too preoccupied with their sexual preference and
should “shut up.” At other places and moments, straight people would not hesitate to ask
the most intimate questions that they themselves would never discuss with others, for
example about “male” and “female” roles in couples, dark rooms, cruising, or kinky sex.
Gay men were never allowed to physically touch straight colleagues who would not
hesitate themselves to do so “for fun.” In general, lesbians were as always much more
invisible. Gay parades often functioned as a negative reference point for both gay and
straight. They were considered to be too transgressive in terms of gender and sexual
behavior: too much drag, nudity, and kinky sex. The acceptance of gay men was always
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under the condition that they must not be too visible, unmasculine or sexual.30
When it comes to ethnicity, the report concluded that anti-homosexual attitudes were to
be found among people who were actively involved in religion and had less education.
These factors are higher among ethnic minorities. Websites of Moroccans and Turks, but
also those catering to right-wing young males, had higher levels of anti-gay remarks than
orthodox Christian ones. So the picture of tolerance for gays and lesbians was not very
comforting and the high expectations of 2001, when legal equality was realized, did not
materialize in the social world of 2006. Gays and lesbians remained second-class citizens
and if they were accepted, it was under the aforementioned conditions for gay men, while
the lesbians remained invisible, and many of them appear to like it that way.
The report came to several conclusions. Stricter policies should be enacted to counter
concrete examples of discrimination. Vulnerable groups among gays and lesbians—like
the young, the elderly, and ethnic minorities—needed additional support. Greater
visibility was needed, particularly in schools, where most prejudices about homosexuals,
“sissies,” and “sluts” are learned from peers. As always, since the beginning of gay and
lesbian emancipation politics in the 1980s, the visibility of lesbians should be enhanced.
In the follow-up study of 2010 the acceptance of homosexuality among the Dutch was
still higher than in 2006, but on the other hand, the pressure to behave “normally” had not
changed, or perhaps had even become stronger for students in primary and secondary
schools.31 Straight students were said to accept gay and lesbian classmates if they would
be “authentic,” meaning not behaving differently in terms of gender and sexuality. In
other words, only heterosexual behavior was seen as authentic, and sexual and gender
variation was rejected. Survey data indicated that it takes young queers three to four years
from the realization of same-sex feelings to telling someone else about this, a surprisingly
long time for a country that praises its levels of acceptance.32 A full fifty percent of the
young queers surveyed had seriously considered committing suicide, while psychological
problems such as depression were common among gay and lesbian young people.33
Part of the study concerned ethnic minorities (Surinamese, Moroccan, Turkish, and
Chinese) and orthodox Protestants. In these groups, acceptance of homosexuality is far
from realized. The attitude is that gays and lesbians should keep silent and not trouble
straight culture. Homosexuality continued to be rejected because it is “sinful,”
pathological, and/or unnatural, and because gays and lesbians did not marry and
reproduce, were gender dissidents, engaged in filthy sex, and made visible what should
remain invisible. Most gays and lesbians from these groups kept silent and remained
invisible out of consideration for their parents and families, as well as indisputably
fearing or having already experienced negative reactions. Few people, and mainly
politicians in the case of ethnic minorities, took up their defense, and with limited
success. Acceptance of homosexuality has become a litmus test for Dutch citizenship.
Although one may question how many “white” Dutch would pass it, ethnic minorities,
like orthodox Protestants, are seen as the people who do not accept gays and lesbians.
Because of the pressure to integrate, a considerable number of ethnic people—in
particular Muslims—opt out, migrate, or radicalize. As long as they are “white,”
orthodox Christians are seen as less foreign to Dutch culture, and so they get less
criticism, but the black evangelicals among them have been the object of social ridicule
and contempt.
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Another report I participated in regarded anti-gay violence in Amsterdam.34 The city
requested a study after several incidents were widely reported in the press in the
aftermath of the Gay Canal Parade of August 2007. The aim was to know the motives of
the perpetrators. What was surprising was the rhetoric of the city officials who claimed
that mayor and alderwomen and aldermen discussed the topic on a nearly daily basis, and
the subsequent lack of the promised support for the study by these politicians and civil
servants who had claimed great interest. Other local institutions, such as schools, sport
and ethnic organizations, and youth social workers, were hesitant to cooperate as well.
Ambivalence regarding homosexuality remained the rule in Holland’s gay capital. The
results of the research confirmed the national study. Some 200 cases of anti-gay violence
were reported to the police in 2007, from insults to robberies and severe physical injuries.
The perpetrators were mainly young men, with Moroccans being overrepresented. Of the
47 perpetrators arrested for physical violence, 36 percent were white and 36 percent
Moroccan, while their representation among youngsters under 25 years in Amsterdam is,
respectively, 39 percent and 16 percent. Surinamese were clearly underrepresented,
accounting for four percent of the perpetrators but twelve percent of the youth. Both
perpetrators and young men from the groups that they belong to were interviewed: white
hooligans, marines and fraternity (corps in Dutch) students,35 and urban street youth of
Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese, and Antillean descent. Additional cases were used from
court and probation offices,36 and a survey was done among secondary school students.
The perpetrators and the male youth generally stated they accepted homosexuals, but,
again, on the condition that they should not behave in unmasculine, too sexual, or too
visible ways. Most problems arose when the young men felt they were the object of
unwanted gay attention. In most cases, this gay interest was probably more imagined than
real, and interestingly, some of the perpetrators visited gay places (discos, cruising areas)
out of curiosity, and then discovered that in those situations, gay men are not only objects
but also subjects of desire. The straight youngsters did not want to become an object of
desire, a position they consider to belong to females. (Their ideas show little rationality
because they were afraid of the overtures of gay men, but why should they be afraid of
those unmasculine men?) They disliked homosexual visibility, although the Moroccan
men in particular preferred queers to be visible (so as to prevent unexpected proposals
from gay men who behave “normally”).
They found homosexuality so filthy that they eagerly wanted to watch it. And their idea
that men should be the subject and women the object of desire has little to do with sexual
reality in which roles are not dichotomous, but are mixed in different ways. Their ideas
about homosexuality focused mainly on gender and sexual issues. When the young men
in the focus groups were asked to give their first impressions about homosexuality, it was
all about anal sex and gender and not about religion. It does not mean that their negative
attitudes had nothing to do with religion, but that their spontaneous ideas regarded gender
and sexuality.
Although the survey also showed more accepting attitudes, the abusive climate of
schools and schoolyards became particularly clear. Up to fifty percent of the male pupils
were confronted with insults that targeted their gender and/or sexual behavior as being
inappropriate (meaning too unmasculine or non-heterosexual). To twenty percent, this
happened frequently. Only ten percent of the male students expressed homosexual
preferences, indicating that not only young gays and lesbians are targets of such
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disciplining behavior, but also many others that deviate from what are deemed to be
appropriate gender and sexual roles. This study also made clear that heterosexuals are
being created and that this production of straight kids demands great coercion. This goes
together with the enforcement of dichotomous gender roles: boys should become men
and girls should become women. It is likely that the presence of large numbers of ethnic
minority students strengthens this sexual and gender disciplining, on the one hand
because they come from families that are more prone to impose dichotomous gender
roles and are more likely to deny homosexual inclinations, and on the other hand because
school teachers in “black schools” (with a majority of non-white students) are more
hesitant to discuss, let alone criticize, traditional gender and sexual norms. Teachers and
authorities do little to counter them out of the fear of having to deal with “difficult”
themes, such as AIDS, homosexuality, or masturbation. Sometimes they even enhance
them by lax policies, not defending insulted queer adolescents, and not changing a school
climate that is intolerant of gender and sexual diversity. The minimal investment in sex
education, which is not obligatory in Dutch schools, has not changed. If it happens at all,
it remains focused on the biology of sex organs, STDs, and how to prevent unwanted
pregnancies.37 Due to the very ambivalent and sometimes prejudiced attitudes of the
secondary school students, the study suggested that more attention is needed for sexual
citizenship education, certainly in black schools. Topics like Arab pederast history or
Surinamese lesbians could be included for all schools because social forms of
homosexuality are not particular to Western countries, as some people assume.38
VIII. Conclusions
We have gone a long way from Morocco as a gay paradise to the present situation in the
Netherlands, where Moroccans are considered homophobes. There is now a cultural
divide that differentiates, in white Dutch eyes, the liberal, pro-gay Dutch from the
conservative, anti-gay Muslims. It is an artificial divide. Nowadays, prejudices against
homosexuality remain strong among young Dutch men and are not very different
between white and ethnic minority groups. Gay men are often seen by male youth of all
ethnicities as unmasculine, oversexual, and too visible, and may only be accepted under
the condition that they do not show any of this behavior. On one hand, Dutch politics and
institutions proclaim that they reject anti-gay attitudes, but there are few signs that these
proclamations are more than empty rhetoric. Little is done to defend gays and lesbians,
certainly not “sissies” and “dykes,” and nothing is done to break through the
heteronormativity of Dutch culture. Homosexuality has become a big issue and gays and
lesbians may enjoy the pleasure of receiving much attention but their situation is not
being improved. In fact, the mounting number of gender- and gay-related slurs and
insults in schoolyards seems rather to indicate that gender roles are more strictly imposed
and heterosexuality becomes an increasingly rigid norm. Gay and lesbian emancipation
may work out well for those who identify as homosexual, but the relative openness and
visibility are creating an ever stronger separation of homo- and heterosexuality because
the former remains the marginal and rejected category.
This goes with a normalization of queers who should not be obvious, overly sexual, or
unmasculine. According to straight journalists, gay men should give up public cruising
and the promiscuity of dark rooms because they can marry. The gay movement has by
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now successfully distanced itself from pedophiles, accepting an age of consent of sixteen
years. This delivers the younger queers to heteronormative institutions like family,
school, and sports. Young queers will have great difficulties in defending variant
gendered and sexual expressions of themselves and others against the pressure of parents,
peers, and others, or to begin to understand queer institutions of the past such as a gay
community, public and kinky sex, or promiscuity. This leads to questions of sexual
democracy or citizenship rights in contemporary societies. At what age do such privileges
start (for the United Nations, at age 18); what do they include and exclude; why should
monogamy, marriage, heterosexuality, and privacy be the sexual norm; and why do
certain sexual practices like pedophilia, bestiality, public sex, and sex work become
unthinkable?
The homosexual situation in the Netherlands looks very much like what Joe Massad
fears for the Arab world once the “Gay International” has imposed gay identities on a
world that does not know them.39 His fear that the Arab world will be divided between a
normative heterosexual majority and a marginal gay minority has become true in the
Netherlands, and in the Western world more generally. There is even a growing group of
gay-identifying Arabs and Turks. Massad’s idea that homosexual identities are imposed
by LGBT movements is overestimating their influence. Rather, NGOs, media, movies,
sciences, churches and other social institutions spread the gay and straight messages. It is
a global development in which the “Gay International” plays a minor role, even in the
West. On the one hand, Massad does not even offer the suggestion of a solution about
how to counter the imposition of Western sexual ideologies. On the other hand, he has
little compassion for the miseries that non-normative Arabs suffer for their sexual
behavior (i.e., girls that “should” stay at home or do not accept arranged marriages; ibnes
and zemels that face abjection or even worse, in some countries, the death penalty). Such
agonies are too easily attributed to (post)colonialism. Many criticisms are possible about
gay and lesbian emancipation and sexual identity politics, but numerous male, female,
and transgender queers profited from those models and defend them.
Queer scholars have taken the position that we should reject the Islamophobia of the
Right, and of gay men, but have not formulated an answer to the homophobia of Muslims
and sometimes deny its existence. The same people who have rarely hesitated to attack
the Catholic church for its stance on homosexuality, abortion, or condoms, suddenly
hesitate to criticize the similar ideas of Muslims. There is little chance that the
compassion queers feel for Muslims will diminish the Islamophobia of “secular” Dutch
people. It neither helps themselves, queer Muslims, their families, nor third parties. It will
not make the orthodox Muslims accept gays, lesbians, queers, transgenders, and certainly
not the abjected ibnes or zemels.
It is interesting to think about queer practices and cultures of homosexual pleasures in
the Orient and Occident without gay identities. There is little chance to see such a
situation given the global emergence of LGBT communities and movements that
embrace this identity. It is unrealistic to denounce its middle-class character. A better
answer is to defend local and global sexual alternatives while struggling against straight
and marital norms and strict gender roles—to discover and stimulate queer paradises in
Holland, Morocco, and elsewhere. It is much better not to oppose Oriental or Occidental
queer worlds, but to use common grounds to resist straight norms and the imposition on
queers to behave “normally.” Perhaps the East is closer to such a utopia than the West.
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Notes
1. Although I prefer the term anti-homosexual to homophobic, I will use both. One
should read both terms in their social dimension: social rejection of homosexuality.
Homophobia, which is most often used in Dutch, sounds too psychological. Anti-queer
attitudes are a social more than an individual or psychological problem because they are
hammered into youngsters’ heads by families, peers, schools, and other social
institutions. See Murray (2009) for an international overview.
2. Numbers for 2010 are on their website, cbs.nl (Dutch Central Office for Statistics). I
will use in this article Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese, Antillean, and Chinese for DutchMoroccan, Dutch-Turkish, Dutch-Surinamese, Dutch-Antillean and Dutch-Chinese. It
will become clear from the context when I use these terms for Turkish Turks, etc.
3. Green 1992.
4. Cottaar et al. 2009.
5. Pels 2003.
6. This and the next part of the article are partially based on my earlier article (Hekma
2002), which discusses this affair in greater detail.
7. Of course, sexuality has its public sides and, in fact, gay and lesbian emancipation has
always been about going public—coming out of the closet—and visibility. These have
been the aims of the gay movement and the government, at least in contemporary
Holland, since the 1980s. Heterosexuality is utterly public as an institution, with its
families and marriage. Advertisements, scarves, prostitution, media, education, and sex
laws also make sexuality a public affair (see Leap 1999).
8. NRC, 31 May 2001. All quoted journal references regard 2001.
9. Vrij Nederland (26 May 2001); Parool (15 June 2001).
10. NRC (5 May 2001).
11. AD (5 and 7 May 2001).
12. Parool (21 May 2001); AD (25 May 2001).
13. NRC (12 May 2001).
14. Parool (9 June 2001).
15. AD (23 May 2001).
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16. This section is partly based on research reported in Saskia Keuzenkamp, ed., Steeds
gewoner, nooit gewoon. Acceptatie van homoseksualiteit in Nederland. Den Haag SCP,
2010. Colleagues at the University of Amsterdam and I contributed the final part on the
views about homosexuality of ethnic minority groups—Surinamese, Moroccan, Turkish,
and Chinese—and orthodox Protestants to the collection. I am personally acquainted with
most of the aforementioned activists.
17. AD (2 and 5 November 2001).
18. NRC (19 May 2001); Trouw (26 May 2001).
19. AD (21 May 2001).
20. NRC (3 August 2001); AD, Parool and Volkskrant (6 August 2001).
21. The movie also wavers between pride of the Netherlands, its history, and its richness
and a serious warning for new immigrants that their homes will be in neighborhoods with
poverty, bad housing, and high levels of criminality. In stark contrast with tourist
information, the sun rarely shines in this documentary and the immigrants are warned
about the rain and cold in Holland. The topic of slavery is mentioned very briefly in a
much longer scene that celebrates the Dutch Golden Age.
22. Butler 2008.
23. See de Leeuw and van Wichelen 2005.
24. Trouw (20 and 21 April 2006).
25. Volkskrant (29 February 2008).
26. De Pers (9 November 2007).
27. The young men, Mahmoud Asgari and Ayaz Marhoni, who were hanged on the 19th
of July, 2005, were condemned for a crime that they had committed when they were
legally minors. The “crime” has variously been said to be homosex with each other or the
homosexual rape of a 13-year-old boy. Other reports claimed racism, the boys being
Arab. The picture is widely used as a symbol of state violence against gay men, for
example, on the first boat in the Amsterdam Gay Canal Parade in 2005. For one of many
discussions, see Pukaar 57 (October 2005).
28. NRC (12 April 2006).
29. Keuzenkamp 2006; Keuzenkamp and Bos 2007.
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30. I prefer “unmasculine” to “feminine” because the rejection of gay men concerns more
their inability or refusal to act masculine than that they would perform something
feminine.
31. Keuzenkamp 2010.
32. Ibid., p. 143.
33. Ibid., pp. 184–194.
34. Buijs et al. 2009.
35. In the case of fraternity students, we interviewed gay instead of straight ones to
prevent “politically correct” answers that we assume students will provide, knowing the
Dutch ideology of tolerance. One gay student told us that he worked so hard in “doing
straight” that he got confused about his sexual preference.
36. van der Vlies 2008.
37. van de Bongardt 2008.
38. See El-Rouayheb 2005; Wekker 2006.
39. Massad 2007.
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